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The mind is its own place, and in itself 
Can make a Heaven of Hell, a Hell of Heaven. 
John Milton, Paradise Lost, Book I, l. 233-234
Abstract
This article introduces an underestimated concept in Digital Humanities emergence history: the 
mind. Following Milad Doueihi suggestion, it revisits Alan Turing article (1950) as a milestone 
in the DH genealogy. The mind appears here as the key-concept, at stake in the confrontation 
of Turing with Ada Lovelace. The article demonstrates that the mind has to be considered in 
connection with the brain, the spirit and the ‘unthought’ (see Katherine Hayles and Nathalie 
Sarraute). The mind appears at the end of the inquiry as a place to keep together the physical 
brain and the poetical dimension, illustrated by the spirit. An example of the perception of the 
Apple logo, presented in Introduction and Conclusion, underlines that unthought elements are 
always present in a cultural context.
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1. Introduction:	What	do	you	have	in	mind?
What do you have in mind when you say “apple”? Maybe the fruit you are eating regularly, 
but maybe also the Apple logo you see many times per day on a smartphone, computer, 
on your own things or in advertising. Indeed, if we google “Apple”, the computing logo 
arrives before a real fruit, and ranks second in case of the free search engine Qwanta.
But in a surprising way, even if the Apple logo tends to be so clearly present in our 
culture, the historian Stephen Greenblatt does not devote a line to it in his detailed 
inquiry about the reception of the myth of Adam and Eve (Greenblatt, 2017).  The fruit, 
and its interpretation as an “apple” is thus carefully discussed in his study. Greenblatt 
reminds us that the biblical text does not mention an “apple”, but a fruit (16), present 
in the entire history of its reception (see especially 128, 129, 137), with interesting 
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Reformer Gerrard Winstanley at the 17th century (195, 357). But one cannot find in this 
monograph a single word about the Apple computer entreprise and its logo with a bite, 
not even in a footnote. 
Greenblatt explains, of course, that “over the centuries there have been innumerable 
interpretations of the story of Adam and Eve. Many of the most influential interpretations 
figure in this book. But it is impossible to convey the full richness, variety, cunning, and 
on occasion wildness of the vast archive that has accumulated and that continues to 
grow” (303). Nevertheless, the fact that the computing Apple did not find an evocation in 
this book remains a kind of a “cultural blind spot”. Passing from the printed culture to the 
digital one, similar dichotomies between the form and the content happen regularly, as 
for example our way to speak about “dematerialization” for what is digital (Clivaz, 2016). I 
first introduced this phenomenon in my overview article on digital culture (Clivaz, 2012, 32). 
Each time it happens, it means an opportunity to go deeper in senses and significations.
That’s the case for the Apple logo. This article will focus on the dimension that is at 
stake when one draws attention to the logo Apple symbol, leaving all the potential of 
this logo for other opportunities. The chosen point is the mind, and its impact in the 
emergence and definition of what one call digital humanities. Indeed the word “mind” is 
present in the very first version of the Apple logo, drawn by Ronald Gerald Wayne, the 
third co-founder of Apple, and briefly used for one year (Linzmayer, 2004, 6). This logo 
represents Isaac Newton, sitting down under an apple tree, with an apple in a circle 
of light and a verse of poet William Wordsworth: “Newton… a mind for ever voyaging 
through strange seas of thought, alone” (Wordsworth, 1805, l. 62–63). In quite a long 
poem of Wordsworth, the “spirit” is also evoked: “My spirit was up, my thoughts were 
full of hope” (Wordsworth, 1805, l. 18). And also what cannot or has not been thought: 
“I was obedient as a lute that waits upon the touches of the wind. Unknown, unthought 
of, yet I was most rich. I had a world about me, ‘twas my own” (Wordsworth, 1805, l. 
138–140; my italics).
The notion of the mind has been present since the beginning of the Apple adventure, 
in its first logo. One can also find it in Hebrew or German translations of the English 
expression ‘digital humanities’: ruach digitalit (digital spirit, in Hebrew); in German: 
“die digitalen Geisteswissenschaften”; one speaks also about “der digitale Geist”. Each 
language considers this lexical field differently: French and German have only one word 
for “mind” and “spirit” (esprit and Geist). We face here a subtle linguistic point that could 
lead to further deep inquiries. In the framework of this article, we will begin to question 
the idea of the “mind” in the digital humanities, with our attention drawn to this concept 
by the first Apple logo.
In section 2, we will consider the necessity to adopt different points of view to visit the 
history of the emergence of the digital humanities, and propose to start with the famous 
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mind. Section 3 will discuss this complicated text, keeping attention to the question of 
the mind. Meanwhile, we will consider the question of gender as an additional element, 
since Ada Lovelace plays an important role in Turing’s article. After having enlarged the 
notion of mind by situating it in the triad mind-brain-spirit (section 4), the conclusion will 
come back to our starting point : the Apple logo.
2.	Revisiting	the	emergence	of	the	digital	humanities
It is always useful to keep in mind the Plato’s adage about “taking once again a fresh 
starting point suitable to the matter” (Plato, Timaeus 48b). It sounds particularly ade-
quate when looking at diverse ways to choose a starting point to narrate the history of 
the digital humanities. Busa’s visit to the IBM president in 1949 is often seen emblem-
atic. In a recent article, Domenico Fiormonte affirms that there is no doubt that “Busa’s 
undertaking founded the discipline of the Humanities Computing (although years later 
it was renamed Digital Humanities), but above all it laid the groundwork for a profound 
epistemological and cultural transformation” (Fiormonte, 2017, 30). But this starting 
point, even if evident for so many of us and for so many reasons, can be questioned. It is 
indeed situated in a specific context.
As I pointed in a previous article (Clivaz, 2017), Steven E. Jones’ clever monograph about 
Busa demonstrates that “IBM’s interests in 1949–1952 surely included shoring up post-
war diplomatic relations with the Vatican, Italy, and Europe as a whole just at the advent 
of its World Trade Corporation” (Jones, 2016, 97). Conscious of this commercial context, 
Busa asks in a private letter written in 1960 if the cooperation between a businessman 
and a priest is blessed by God, and concludes yes, referring to an unidentified biblical 
verse. As Jones narrates:
After discussing machinery and an upcoming conference in Tübingen, Father Busa closed 
by reporting that the work of the Center (CAAL) continued ‘at full speed’, and then posed 
a question : ‘Do you think will God praise this co-operation of a high businessman with a 
priest ? I guess yes, for in the Bible He said that the business can, if we want, lead people 
to find Him each day’. A copy of the letter was sent to Paul Tasman with a typed note 
attached (probably written by an assistant to Mr. Watson) that joked, ‘Mr. Tasman, As a 
Bible student I wonder where Father Busa finds such a statement ??? Kay M.’ I leave the 
biblical question to the theologians, but the very fact that Busa posed the question (then 
answered it so quickly) indicates that he recognized in 1960 that it was debatable and might 
be controversial, the cooperation and alliance between the businessman and the priest, the 
technology corporation and the academic (and Jesuit) research project (Jones, 2016, 97).
This lengthy paragraph exactly outlines the controversies around a genealogical interpre-
tation of Busa as the “DH father”. Another important name in the pre-DHers generation is 
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in the DH oral history, have been able to shed light on informal but nevertheless decisive 
moments, such as this one : “Tito Orlandi recounts that his earliest memory of a computer 
dates to the 1950s when he saw an IBM machine in the window of an IBM shop in Milan. 
Around 1960, together with his PhD supervisor Ignazio Cazzaniga, he engaged in some 
brief exploratory work to see what role punched card technology might play in the making 
of a critical edition of Augustine’s City of God” (Nyhan and Flinn, 2016, 75). In the reception 
history, Aquinas won over Augustine: in a similar way, Busa Aquinas electronic index has 
overcome Ellison electronic biblical index in the traditional memory of the DH emergence 
(Jones, 2016, 14). But it is time to open our memories to diverse remembrances.
Looking at progressive diversification of our perception of recent history, I was inspired 
by Milad Doueihi to consider Alan Turing’s article “Computing Machinery and Intelli-
gence” (1950). Indeed, the French thinker suggested to start DH history with Turing’s 
article in 2014 (Doueihi, 2014, 8–9). Turing is at the same time a central scientific figure, 
and, socially speaking, a marginalized figure from the 1950s UK, calling to include the 
mind into consideration. Indeed, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence” starts in this 
way: “I propose to consider the question, ‘Can machines think?’. This should begin with 
definitions of the meaning of the terms ‘machine’ and ‘think’” (Turing, 1950, 433). Let’s 
see what happens to this question.
3.	Alan	Turing,	the	mind	and	Ada	Lovelace
This important article on computing and epistemology was published in Mind, a journal 
funded in 1876 with a high prestige as a philosophy journal from the 50s; it was progres-
sively open to diverse subjects areas. By submitting his article to the journal, Turing 
gave it an impressive interdisciplinary impact, a strong focus that he will keep through 
all his life, working ultimately on patterns in biology. 
The machine that he is analyzing is the “digital computer”, an expression that sounds 
redundant to our ears, but not in the 50s. The first written trace we have of the English 
words ‘digital’ and ‘computer’ combined in a single phrase as opposed to an analogue 
computer, goes back to a 1942 scientific report by George Robert Stibitz (Williams, 1984, 
310). In “Computing Machinery”, Turing writes, assessing the impact of the digital com-
puter: “the present interest in ‘thinking machines’ has been aroused by a particular kind 
of machine, usually called an ‘electronic computer’ or ‘digital computer’. Following this 
suggestion we only permit digital computers to take part in our game” (Turing, 1950, 
436). He describes an ideal digital computer as a ‘human computer’:
The idea behind digital computers may be explained by saying that these machines are 
intended to carry out any operations which could be done by a human computer. The 
human computer is supposed to be following fixed rules; he has no authority to deviate 
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is altered whenever he is put on to a new job. He has also an unlimited supply of paper 
on which he does his calculations. He may also do his multiplications and additions on a 
‘desk machine’, but this is not important (Turing, 1950, 436).
To open the possibility for this machine – described as a human computer – to really think, 
Turing explains that a random element should be added to it (438). Random element and 
‘free will’ are the necessary elements to go in the direction of letting it ‘think’. It is his way 
to counter the strongest of the six objections towards the idea that a machine could think. 
The strongest objection was raised by Ada Lovelace (Ambramson, 2008, 157). As Turing 
summarizes it: “Our most detailed information of Babbage’s Analytical Engine comes 
from a memoir by Lady Lovelace (1842). In it she states, ‘The Analytical Engine has no 
pretensions to originate anything. It can do whatever we know how to order it to perform’ 
(her italics)” (Turing, 1950, 447). Valeria Aurora pointed out, in defense of Ada Lovelace, 
that Turing misread her, while she was defending the same point of view as Turing (Aurora, 
2016, 232–233). As far as I have been able to verify it, Turing does not seem to refer to 
Lovelace’s work itself but to Douglas Hartree’s work (Turing, 1951, 2). Turing wrestles with 
what he considers “Lovelace’s objection”. To overcome this point, he develops two main 
arguments, and the first one is the random element idea, which leads him to speaking 
about digital computers in an anthropomorphic fashion (see sentence in italics):
A better variant of the objection says that a machine can never ‘take us by surprise’. 
This statement is a more direct challenge and can be met directly. Machines take me by 
surprise with great frequency. This is largely because I do not do sufficient calculation to 
decide what to expect them to do, or rather because, although I do a calculation, I do it in 
a hurried, slipshod fashion, taking risks. (Turing, 1950, 448)
To concede or recognize that the machine has the possibility to originate something, is a 
surprise for the human, Turing has to put in balance the moments where his own human 
mind is somehow inefficient : “because I do not do sufficient calculation… or I do it in a 
hurried fashion, taking risks”. This breaking point in Turing’s argumentation is fascinat-
ing : it recognizes an implicit concurrency between the human mind and computational 
potential, something that has become today explicit and everyday is growing up. In the 
fifties, Turing is already hoping for our present computing developments. Coming back 
at the end of the text to Lovelace’s objection – the one which means the most to him –, 
he gives the future as the horizon to give her a full answer one day: “Let us return for a 
moment to Lady Lovelace’s objection, which stated that the machine can only do what 
we tell it to do (452). […] The only really satisfactory support that can be given for the 
view expressed will be that provided by waiting for the end of the century and then doing 
the experiment described” (Turing, 1950, 455).
The second argument that Turing opposes to Lovelace objection’s is the brain, or a pure 
mechanical perception of the mind, that he simply put in as synonymous of the mind : 
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“In considering the functions of the mind or the brain, we find certain operations which 
we can explain in purely mechanical terms. This we say does not correspond to the real 
mind: it is a sort of skin, which we must strip off if we are to find the real mind. But then 
in what remains we find a further skin to be stripped off, and so on. Proceeding in this 
way do we ever come to the “real” mind, or do we eventually come to the skin, which has 
nothing in it? In the latter case the whole mind is mechanical” (Turing, 1950, 454–455).
Should we speak here about Turing’s demystification of an old Western concept of 
‘mind’? Almost seventy years later, it has at last become evident that ‘brain’ is a word 
really more challenging for scholars than ‘mind’, especially if we consider the huge 
European flagship Humain Brain Project. Turing’s proposal could, after all, sound simpler 
compared to the one used today: let’s consider simply the skin, as it is, without other 
dimensions implied. Starting on this base, making the digital computer similar to a 
mechanical human brain does not sound so impossible, if we add the random element 
recommended by Turing.
I do not claim I would like to oppose this point of view. My attempt is to emphasize an 
important missing word or concept in Turing’s essay about the mind: the spirit. As we 
have seen, English separates the meanings unified in similar words in German or French. 
It is not surprising that Turing does not consider this concept in his article, since his 
favorite option, to resist the main objection by Lovelace, is to compare the mind to the 
physical brain. What is missing in a text seems to matter. Section 2 introduced the spirit 
in Wordsworth’s poem: “My spirit was up, my thoughts were full of hope”. In the Judeo-
Christian tradition, the spirit has a long gender pre-history: it is female in Hebrew and in 
the biblical Old Testament or Hebrew Bible (rouach); it is neutral in Greek and in the New 
Testament of the Christian Bible (pneuma). Only Latin turned it into a male word (spiri-
tus). The spirit represents a flexible and open element in the Christian trinity, or even a 
female one in the Hebrew Bible.
If Turing does not speak about the spirit, it is worth to notice that genders are present 
in this text, as aside element. At the very beginning, he describes people playing an 
‘imitation game’ in this way: “It is played with three people, a man (A), a woman (B), and an 
interrogator (C) who may be of either sex” (Turing, 1950, 433). Further, he assumes that “the 
best strategy is to try to provide answers that would naturally be given by a man. […] One 
might for instance insist that the team of engineers should be all of one sex, but this would 
not really be satisfactory, for it is probably possible to rear a complete individual from a 
single cell of the skin (say) of a man” (435–436). In context of the 50s, such a point of view 
in an academic text is surely common and understandable. Nevertheless, the person who 
presents a stronger objection to Turing is Ada Lovelace, a woman. A full gender reading of 
Turing’s article is something that future scholars will have to do.
One can go a step further by pointing to the absence of the notion of “unthought”, 
expressed in Wordsworth’s poem: “I was obedient as a lute that waits upon the 
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touches of the wind. Unknown, unthought of, yet I was most rich. I had a world about 
me, ‘twas my own ” (Wordsworth, 1805, l. 138–140). This notion is taking an important 
place in the DH landscape and it is outlined in the last book of Katherine Hayles, 
Unthought. The power of the cognitive nonconscious (2017). Back in 2012, she was 
already describing the meaning of the “unthought” using this example : “A woman who 
worked on Morse code receiving […] during World War II reported that after her intense 
experiences there, she heard Morse code everywhere – in traffic noise, bird songs, 
and other ambient sounds – with her mind automatically forming the words to which 
the sounds putatively corresponded. Although no scientific data exist on the changes 
sound receiving made in neural functioning, we may reasonably infer that it brought 
about long-lasting changes in brain activation patterns, as this anecdote suggests” 
(Hayles, 2012, 127–128; my italics).
Is such an example taking us back from the “spirit” to the brain, as described by Turing? 
We stand here in fact at a subtle crossroad between the nonconscious, the unthought, 
the materiality and the poetics. We realize it by reading a poetical description of the 
unthought, written by Nathalie Sarraute, a French author, born in Ivanovo-Voznessensk 
in 1900, and dead in Paris in 1999. In her book Tropism, she describes in a narrative way 
how we are affected by the “unthought”; she describes the unconscious movements 
of the brain, of our emotions: “These movements, of which we are hardly cognizant, 
slip through us on the frontiers of consciousness in the form of indefinable, extremely 
rapid sensations. They hide behind our gestures, beneath the words we speak and the 
feelings we manifest, all of which we are aware of experiencing, and are able to define. 
They seemed, and still seem to me to constitute the secret source of our existence, in 
what might be called its nascent state” (Sarraute, The Age of Suspicion, 1956; engl. 
Tribout-Joseph, 2008, 13). Sarraute comments here on the literary and poetic effect she 
developed in Tropismes (first published in 1931).
It is probably crucial to notice that Sarraute uses a literary example in 1931 and 1956 
to demonstrate what we are now beginning to describe physically as a phenomenon 
happening in our brain. These two aspects should not be separated. The ‘mind’ is 
eminently at stake when we enact our capacity to relate the poetic dimension and 
physical brain in order to represent the reality to ourselves. The ‘spirit’, beyond its 
theological flavor, belongs to the poetical sphere, and triggers a long tradition of our 
capacity to express the ‘unthought’, as shown in this passage from Paul of Tarsus: “In 
the same way, the Spirit helps us in our weakness. We do not know what we ought to 
pray for, but the Spirit himself intercedes for us through wordless groans” (Rm 8,26). 
Wordless groans of the spirit and unthought of the mind lead to situate our perception 
of the brain in a cultural framework.
In summary, I would say that the mind that becomes conscious of its debt to the brain 
stays in touch with its spiritual part, as long as it produces poetical expressions, 
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seeking the ‘unthought’. We can notice that placing the ‘unthought’ below the rational 
line of argumentation, Turing’s article also shows implicit dimensions, such as the one 
of gender. To follow Milad Doueihi’s suggestion – to begin a DH history with Turing’s 
article – means to give voice to Turing and Lovelace, a man and a woman, two people 
who have not been at the center of the stage in their contemporary societies for gender 
or sexual orientation issues. It is a fascinating place to start a DH history and reconfigure 
the notion of ‘mind’ from Turing’s ‘imitation game’ to the cognitive unthought introduced 
by Hayles. If now we come back to our starting question – the Apple logo –, we face 
Turing’ questions and gender questions in the quest for the origin of the logo that is so 
emblematic of the digital culture. 
4.	Conclusion	:	the	Apple	logo
Where does the Apple logo come from? What does a bitten apple mean, first colored, 
then in grey or metal color? Such a question is raised in the academic movie Le modèle 
Turing produced by Catherine Bernstein in 2012. The French philosopher Michel Serres 
claims in the film that the bitten apple in the logo refers to the dramatic story about 
Turing’s death. Turing is supposed to have committed suicide by eating a poisoned apple: 
“ce logo, c’est toujours la pomme de Turing, il n’y a aucun doute là-dessus”; “this logo 
is always the Turing apple, there is no doubt about that” (Bernstein, 2012, minute 26, 
21–24). Before that, Serres explains that he agrees with a dramatic story about Turing’s 
sucide : “I belive it is true” (Bernstein, 2012, minute 25, 18–27).
I am much obliged to the Pommier publisher for an opportunity to ask Michel Serres if he 
had any evidence confirming the origin of the Apple logo. In fact, it was just an oral story 
heard from several colleagues in the Silicon Valley. Ian Watson (2012) clarifies the story. 
He explains that Stephen Fry, a BBC presenter, speaks in a BBC program about Steve 
Jobs, Apple founder, denying the fact that the Turing apple was the origin for the logo: “It 
isn’t true, but God we wish it were!”. Watson comments: “Whenever I see the Apple logo I 
remember Turing, for without his discoveries Apple’s products would not exist” (Watson, 
2012, 85). Additional evidence on the topic was produced by Wozniak, Apple co-founder 
who said in 2004 that he never asked Jobs about the origin of the apple choice: “Steve 
Jobs had just come back from one of his trips and we were driving along he said ‘I’ve got 
a great name: Apple Computer’. Maybe he worked in apple trees. I didn’t even ask. Maybe 
it had some other meaning to him” (Linzmayer, 2004, 5). There is nothing on Turing’s 
story Linzmayer’s book written in 2004. Apparently, the phrase emerged later.
The link to Turing did not relate to the original choice of an apple in the Apple logo. In-
deed, we have seen the Newton apple – without a bite – in the very first version of the 
logo drawn by Wayne, in section 1. According to graphic designer Rob Janoff, “the ‘bite’ 
in the Apple logo was originally implemented so that people would know that it repre-
sented an apple, and not a cherry tomato”, as a second step (Think Marketing, 2012). 
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Nevertheless, Watson comment shows that the “Turing interpretation” of the Apple 
logo is now strongly embedded as an interpretation effect in the perception of the logo 
history. It will surely be successful, since the LGTB rights have now really progressed: 
the interpretation is emblematic in this case.
In summary, one can say that the choice of an apple, combined with a powerful verse 
from Wordsworth, was very successful for Apple Compagny. As Jean-Louis Gassée, for-
mer Apple executive and founder of BeOS, explains: “One of the deep mysteries to me 
is our logo, the symbol of lust and knowledge, bitten into, all crossed with the colors 
of the rainbow in the wrong order. You couldn’t dream a more appropriate logo: lust, 
knowledge, hope and anarchy” (Think Marketing, 2012). The apple of Adam and Eve al-
ready had all these symbolic dimensions. It remains an ambiguous fruit that we contem-
plate about each time we open our Apple computer or use our iPhone, a kind of digital 
pharmakon. Corrupted or safe, entire or bitten, poisoned or tasty, the apple is the same 
fruit. Humans transform it according to their responsibility and sense of duty. It was the 
opinion of Augustin, a philosopher and Christian writer, from the 5th century: “The apples 
of the fatal tree were the same kind as the apples Adam and Eve had already found to 
be harmless on other trees” (Augustin, On Genesis; quoted by Greenblatt, 2017, 343, 
footnote 113). Our minds have a difficult duty to distinguish between them.
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